these texts that invites us to probe more deeply and ask what theological, philosophical, or theodical work these images of heavenly procedure are doing. 4 This essay will argue that John Rawls' distinction between types of procedural justice can help shed light on the conceptual difference between rabbinic procedural justice in ordinary courtrooms and as a relational model for God. As the rabbis transfer their robust concept of "justice as fairness" into the heavenly realm, a choice is made to relate to God in ways that emphasize agency, participation, and, indeed, the predictability of law-many basic elements of human dignity, according to modern thinkers, and the type of recognition for which Job desperately hungered. It comes, however, at the expense of what one might see as substantive justice: the ability to assess the justice of the aftermath of fair procedures, to determine whether a person's, or the community of Israel's, current circumstances, are, indeed, just. In several passages in Sifre Deuteronomy, the rabbis appear to depict "pure procedural justice" as a model for relating to God and making sense of suffering, but they also begin to apprehend its limitations.
John Rawls and Procedural Justice
John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, a philosophy of political society built on the social contract and steeped in liberal, enlightenment thought, is surely not easily applicable to the ancient world. However, Rawls' basic premise-justice as fairness-is founded in procedural justice, and as such his theory may be useful as a heuristic tool to understand early rabbinic concepts of justice, which similarly emphasize procedural fairness. In his seminal work, Rawls distinguishes between "perfect," "imperfect," and "pure" procedural justice. "Perfect" procedural justice can be exemplified by the classic cake-cutting dilemma: how does one divide a cake equally between several people so that no one feels cheated? The "obvious solution" (as per Rawls): have the one who cuts the cake choose his or her piece last. This model reveals two characteristic features of perfect procedural justice. First, there is an independent criterion for what is a fair division, a criterion defined
